The westernmost beach of the five landing areas of the Normandy Invasion was Utah. It
was assaulted on June 6, 1944 (D-Day of the invasion), by elements of the U.S.
4th Infantry Division and was taken with relatively few casualties. In the predawn hours of D-Day, units of the 82nd and 101st
airborne divisions were airdropped inland from the landing beach. They suffered many casualties from drowning and enemy fire
but succeeded in their aim of isolating the seaborne invasion force from defending German units.
Located on the eastern shore of the base of the Cotentin Peninsula, Utah Beach was a late
addition to the areas scheduled for invasion. The original plan
for Operation Overlord did not call for a landing on the Cotentin, but General Dwight D. Eisenhower, supreme commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, added it to ensure an early
capture of the port of Cherbourg
at the northern tip of the peninsula.
The Utah landing area
was approximately 5 km (3 miles) wide and was located northwest of the Carentan estuary on sandy, duned beaches. Compared
with German fortifications at Omaha Beach, the defenses at Utah,
based on fixed infantry positions, were sparse because the low-lying areas immediately behind the landing area were flooded
and the Germans could control the flooding with locks. Four causeways exited the beach through the flooded lowlands and severely
restricted movement inland. Indeed, all land traffic was restricted to established routes, especially through the important
crossroads towns of Carentan and Sainte-Mère-Église. Defenses along the causeways consisted mostly of strongpoints equipped
with automatic weapons. Some 3 km (2 miles) inland were coastal and field artillery batteries. The defending forces consisted
of elements of the German 709th, 243rd, and 91st infantry divisions.
The assault sectors at Utah
Beach were designated (from west to east) Tare Green, Uncle Red, and
Victor. The invasion was planned for Tare Green and Uncle Red, with the number 3 causeway almost in the middle of the landing
area. H-Hour (that is, the time at which the first wave of landing craft would hit the beach) was scheduled for 0630 hours.
The beach was to be assaulted by the U.S.
4th Infantry Division. The plan was to cross the beach and seize control of the coast roads, link up with airborne troops
who were to have been dropped inland five hours earlier, and then be prepared to attack toward Cherbourg. The 8th Infantry Regiment was to attack first; supported by 32 special amphibious
Sherman tanks in the first wave, it was to land opposite Les-Dunes-de-Varraville, a well-fortified
The landing plan went wrong from the beginning. Strong currents beset the landing
craft, and the area was obscured by smoke from the preceding shore bombardment. But the main problem was the loss of three
of the four designated control craft to mines. The fourth control craft eventually rounded up the confused landing craft looking
for directions and, using a bullhorn for communication, led them in. The force landed 1,800 metres (2,000 yards) east of the
designated landing area, in the less-defended Victor sector and almost astride causeway number 2.
The assistant division commander, Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., quickly
realized the error. Uttering his famous remark “We'll start the war from here!” he ordered the division to advance.
Three hours later exits 1, 2, and 3 had been secured, and by 1200 hours contact had been made with paratroopers from the 101st
Airborne Division around the town of Pouppeville. By the end
of the day the 4th Division had pushed inland about 6 km (4 miles), and its westernmost units were within a mile of the 82nd
Airborne's perimeter near Sainte-Mère-Église.
For an assault that had begun with such terrible confusion, the Utah Beach landings ended as a spectacular
success beyond the most optimistic expectations. The 1,800-metre error had placed the landing force away from the heavily
defended area of Les-Dunes-de-Varaville and into a less-defended section of beach. Twenty thousand troops and 1,700 motorized
vehicles had landed at Utah with surprisingly few casualties—fewer
than 300 men.
The Germans had not counterattacked the seaborne assault, owing to the success of
the Allied airborne troops in holding the roads that led to the beach approaches and also to confusion among the German commanders
as to exactly where the main attack was taking place. The Germans, however, were in a position to counterattack in the Cotentin Peninsula
at the end of D-Day.
Paratroopers from the U.S. 82nd
and 101st airborne divisions were night-dropped inland on the Cotentin in order to support the amphibious assault at nearby
The drop zones for the 101st Division were labeled A, C, and D and were in the vicinity of roads leading from Utah Beach. Drop zone A was to the west of
Saint-Martin-de-Varreville, while D and C were west and southwest of Sainte-Marie-du-Mont. Drop zones for the 82nd Division
were labeled N, O, and T; they were positioned north of the Douve River and on either side of its principal tributary, the
Merderet—all to the west of Sainte-Mère-Église.
German forces in the Cotentin capable of countering the
airborne divisions were two regiments from the 91st Division (including one battalion of tanks) and the 6th Parachute Regiment.
The main defense of the Cotentin, however, was natural: the flooding of lowlands and marshes, as controlled by a lock near
the mouth of the Douve River
at La Barquette, just north of Carentan. The commander of German forces in Normandy,
Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, had ordered the lock at La Barquette to be opened at high tide in order to flood
the area and closed at low tide to hold the waters in. The entire lowland of the Douve and Merderet rivers was thus a constant
The objective of the 101st Airborne, commanded by Major General Maxwell Taylor, was to seize the inland sides of the four causeways leading from Utah Beach in order to allow the 4th Infantry
Division to exit the beach during the dawn invasion. In addition, they were to destroy two highway bridges and a railroad
bridge north of Carentan on the only good routes across the swamp that the Germans could use to move to the flank of the invasion
area. Finally, they were to seize and hold the lock at La Barquette.
To the west, the objective of the 82nd Airborne, under Major General Matthew Ridgway and Brigadier General James Gavin, was to destroy two bridges on the Douve, capture the crossroads town of Sainte-Mère-Église,
and secure the west bank of the Merderet River and hold a bridgehead there.
Beginning at 2215 hours on D-Day minus 1, more than 900 C-47 aircraft began to transport
13,000 men of the two divisions from England to the Cotentin Peninsula. The drops of both divisions
suffered from scattering—due to a lack of navigational aids as well as enemy ground fire, which forced transport pilots
to take evasive action. Many paratroopers were killed by fire before they hit the ground, and many more were drowned upon
landing in the flooded zones. Those who survived were forced to find one another on the ground and then move and fight in
small groups, many unrelated by unit, rather than in organized battle formations as planned. Many men fought under strange
leaders for unfamiliar objectives. Despite such setbacks, the scattering of the paratroopers had the one advantage of confusing
the Germans, who had great difficulty in determining the size and scope of the force and then moving to counter it.
By the end of D-Day, few objectives had been seized, though the four exits from
were held by the 101st Airborne, and a linkup with the 4th Division had been achieved. The lock at La Barquette was in American
hands, as was the town of Sainte-Mère-Église—but the
Germans were counterattacking there, and control was tenuous. The road and rail bridges over the Douve were still in enemy
hands, and the 82nd Airborne had not made contact with forces from the beach. The western flank of the Normandy Invasion therefore
was anything but secure. Losses had been heavy, each division having suffered some 1,200 casualties.